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of  “Aggressively Unilateral” 
U.S. Trade Actions 
Kimberly Ann Elliott and J. David Richardson 
“Aggressively unilateral” is what America’s trading partners call actions under 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.  The provisions themselves are more than 
twenty  years old; the epithet is of  more recent vintage. A helpful analog for 
those not familiar with the provisions is to labor relations; initiatives  under 
Section 301 are similar to grievance proceedings under a collective-bargaining 
agreement.’ Certain aspects are similar to litigation.2  There have been roughly 
one hundred formal 301 proceedings since 1974, at least thirty others that were 
discouraged or withdrawn at an early stage, and an unknown number that were 
considered, rumored, or fantasized! 
Our main interest is in the determinants of  various types of  resolution  and 
irresolution of 301 actions, from the perspective of negotiators and their con- 
stituents. Our main contributions are to apply familiar statistical methods to 
detect and size up these determinants and then to report the robustness of the 
results.  These statistical approaches  extend and  complement  the exhaustive 
historical and case-study evaluations of  Bayard and Elliott (1994).’ We  also 
update that study, adding fifteen cases to the seventy-two considered there. 
One important conclusion of our work is that the Bayard-Elliott findings are 
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I. On the economics of grievance, see Lewin and Peterson (1988). 
2. For a recent example of the economics of litigation, see Hughes and Snyder (1995). 
3. See also similar evaluations of  Section 301 by Low (1993). Ryan (1995), and Sykes (1992). 
Hudec (1990) is a broader treatment. 
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still relevant  for the updated  and expanded sample of  cases. Our statistical 
approach illuminates  and  confirms  their  evaluations  but  does not  change 
them qualitatively. 
Our most important conclusions, ceteris paribus, are the following: (1) Suc- 
cessful  resolution  of  301 cases is associated  with  high  dependence on the 
United States and “low reciprocity” toward it. High dependence is measured by 
a target country’s share of GNP that is exports to the United States. Reciprocity 
is measured by the US. merchandise trade balance with the target country. 
(2) Section 301 cases about practices that make unfair distinctions at the border 
for merchandise are far more successful than those about nonborder practices 
and services trade. 
By contrast, we also note the following: 
There is little difference in the distribution of  outcomes between cases in- 
volving taxes (other than tariffs) and subsidies and those involving less trans- 
parent regulatory and nontax practices or between cases involving traditional 
trade concerns and those involving less well-established  “new issues” (ser- 
vices trade and intellectual property protection). 
There is little difference in resolution rates, or in the correlates of successful 
resolution, between agricultural and nonagricultural cases. 
There is weak evidence, however, of lower resolution rates among “bullied’ 
trading  partners,  those singled out for a disproportionate  share of  Section 
301 actions over a three-year interval. 
There is no evidence that “big” cases are resolved successfully more often 
or that the correlates of “success” rates differ between big cases and smaller 
ones. 
There is no evidence that explicit, public threats, including the publications 
of  retaliation  “hit lists,” enhance the successful resolution  of  301 negotia- 
tions. 
There is weak evidence, however, of higher resolution rates among cases that 
the US. trade representative’s office was able to bring on its own initiative 
(rather than a petitioner’s) after 1985. 
There is little evidence that Section 301 actions have become more (or less) 
successful over their full twenty-year history, despite legislative and adminis- 
trative refinements that were aimed at making them more effective. Success 
rates were, however, markedly lower in the early 1980s and markedly higher 
in the mid- 1980s, in roughly offsetting ways. This pattern has several obser- 
vationally equivalent interpretations. 
We do not try to estimate the economic consequences of  301 actions or their 
welfare effects, either for the United States or for the world trading regime. To 
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stead, we focus on measures of  negotiating  success or failure and on what 
variables influence them. 
Our measures of negotiating success or failure are founded on petitions and 
public  statements, which list the various issues leading to grievance, and on 
follow-up reports from the U.S. trade representative’s office that evaluate ad- 
herence with respect to these various issues. In our approach, we distinguish 
four classes of resolution and irresolution of Section 301 cases on the basis of 
counting issues covered by agreements and ex post implementation.  We also 
take a quantitative approach to those 301 cases where it is reasonable; in these 
cases, we try to explain the amount of trade recaptured. 
At the margins of our qualitative classes, of course, judgment is required. 
Such judgments are necessarily in the eye of the beholder. We actually employ 
a mix of  subjective judgment and expert opinion in evaluating cases on the 
margins of our objective categories; thus, our dependent variable is more accu- 
rately a consensus variable than a subjective 
Moreover, our approach can be applied easily by anyone with a different set 
of marginal judgments about types of success and failure, and their results can 
be compared to ours5  Finally, explaining perceived success and failure is an 
important task. These are the perceptions that shape political support for Sec- 
tion 301 as well as opposition to it and recommendations to revise it. In that 
spirit, our measurement of  success is objective and politically  sensitive, not 
merely subjective. 
In light of our conclusions, we close the paper with a discussion of the de- 
grees of success to be expected for alternative options to Section 301 for U.S. 
trade grievances. 
8.1  Background 
In broad terms, Section 301 authorizes the president of the United States, or 
the U.S. trade representative  (USTR), to take  action against  “unreasonable, 
unjustifiable, or discriminatory”  practices of foreign trading partners that im- 
pinge on US. commerce. Such actions begin with consultations, often involve 
formal negotiations, and can be enforced by sanctions. There have been a num- 
ber of  legislative and administrative  changes in Section 301 over the years. 
4. Wc  took  seriously  the judgments of  the parties  involved in  Section  301 cases.  solicited 
through extensive interviews conducted by Bayard and Elliott (1994).  Consequently, to the best of 
our ability, we  are explaining the success and failure of  301 actions  in  the eyes of  those with 
the largest political stake, whether as supporters or critics. Our judgments at the margins are not 
fundamentally different from those made in using surveys to code categories such as “in” or “out 
of” the labor force, “head of household’ or not, etc. 
5. To illustrate the value of that, suppose that both we and they find that explicit, public threats 
do not enhance 301 success. Then that conclusion is made more robust to the natural accusation 
that it was due to the vagaries of subjective classification. We, in fact, examine the sensitivity of 
our results to several of the most controversial single-case evaluations. Potential US. Petitioners 
Foreign Firms 
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Nore: Diamonds = decisions; Ovals = outcomes. 
,'Such action can involve informal consultation between U.S. negotiators and target-country negoti- 
ators even before a decision on the petition  is made. Three options are available to the target 
country. Preemptive  concessions  can encourage  the petitioner  to  withdraw the petition  or the 
USTR to reject  it (some so-called p-list cases). Either stonewalling or defiance in the informal 
consultation could lead the USTR to accept the petition and to initiate a 301 case. 
"In the event of  U.S. retaliation, the target country once again can comply, defy, or stonewall. In 
the latter cases, it may also counterretaliate (the EC has counterretaliated in two cases, the linked 
disputes over pasta and citrus in  1985-86 and the enlargement dispute following the accession of 
Spain and Portugal in  1986 [although both the retaliation and the counterretaliation in the latter 
case were symbolic, nonbinding quotas], and Canada in one, the beer war in 1992-93). at which 
point the USTR is faced with a decision to escalate its retaliation (although this has never occurred 
in practice), reopen negotiations, or simply stand on the standoff. 
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Some of these changes expanded its definition of U.S. commerce to non-trade- 
related services, investment,  and intellectual property. Others made its dead- 
lines and procedures  less-or  more-discretionary  (e.g.,  in  1984, the US. 
trade representative was explicitly authorized to initiate 301 cases even without 
a petition from a private-sector plaintiff). And still others created “Special” 
301 procedures for violations of intellectual property rights and “Super” 301 
provisions for egregiously unfair practices by chronically unfair trading part- 
ners  (trade partners with an attitude or maybe an addiction). Understanding 
how a Section 301 case proceeds can be facilitated by examining figure 8.1, a 
stylization to which we return below for purposes of econometric specification. 
Section 30  1 proceedings have been extremely controversial among our trad- 
ing partners, especially since procedural changes made during the 1980s pro- 
moted their more aggressive use and removed elements of presidential discre- 
tion. Some supporters, echoing Hudec (1990) (and ignoring his nuances), have 
seen 301 as a weapon of constructive vigilantism, and others have been quietly 
happy to enjoy its fruits.6 Critics have declared the fruit rotten, reacting with 
outrage at what they see to be a bullying tool of  “aggressive unilateralism.” 
These critics supported the new World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute set- 
tlement mechanisms as a discipline on U.S. recourse to the 301 procedures. 
Among Americans, Section 301 is popular, appealing to our commitment to 
equal opportunity and fair play-for  ourselves, of course, in this case. Support 
for 301 remains strong, as a contingent arsenal, at least until WTO substitutes 
prove themselves effective and fair, and certainly for issues and countries not 
covered by WTO rules. 
Especially among supporters, there is an important unspoken assumption. It 
is that 301 procedures generally work. That is, negotiating goals are usually 
realized and in predictable ways. Even some critics make the same assumption, 
arguing that 301 actions really do force target countries to reduce entry barriers 
or cease restrictive practices. Yet, in the eighty-seven cases we analyze, almost 
half (forty-two) end in degrees of failure by our measures.’ Furthermore, the 
correlates of success and failure are not always what commentators have ex- 
pected. In the popular view, by contrast, the presumption of  success is often 
undiscriminating, as if occasional failure were just a matter of animal spirits, 
one of those things. 
Our methods in this paper allow us to be more discriminating than this, both 
about the chances of success and about what conditions enhance them. 
6. Most 301-inspired concessions are made av%lable to ull a target country’s trading partners, 
not just to the United States. 
7. This is not an unexpected outcome according to the theory of litigation (see Lewin and Pe- 
terson 1988).  “Plaintiff” and “defendant” will often tend to agree that the odds of  either winning 
are roughly fifty-fifty. If  the perceived odds of the plaintiff winning are less than that, then the 
plaintiff will tend not to bring the case; if they are greater, then the defendant will settle “out of 
court” before the case is brought. Differences in perception, harassment, or demonstration motives 
cause variation around this fifty-fifty presumption but do not shift it systematically. We  are in- 
debted to Kenneth Koford for drawing our attention to this parallel literature. 220  Kimberly Ann Elliott and J. David Richardson 
8.2  The Bayard-Elliott Approach and Ours 
Bayard and Elliott (1994) is a comprehensive evaluation of seventy-two Sec- 
tion 301 cases, with in-depth case studies of nine of them. Relying principally 
on historical assessments and tabular and cross-tabular displays, Bayard and 
Elliott drew the following conclusions: 
Section 301 was a reasonably effective tool of U.S. trade policy in the mid- 
and late 1980s. 
Super 301 (created in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of  1988), 
aimed at egregiously unfair partners and practices, was no more effective 
than “regular” 301 in this period. 
Section 301 did not trigger major trade wars, nor did agreements under 301 
typically result in trade diversion. 
But neither did 301 produce large gains for U.S. exporters in most cases. 
Bayard and Elliott (1994, 86-90)  also experimented briefly with some of 
the statistical methods that we use in this paper,  in particular,  the binomial 
probit  approaches. We  extend and reconsider  this part of the Bayard-Elliott 
work. Specifically, we 
adopt binomial probit and tobit and multinomial logit approaches to reevalu- 
ate their assessments while also extending and updating their data set from 
seventy-two Section 301 cases (observations) to eighty-seven (the cases that 
we add are summarized in table 8.1 and discussed in greater detail in the ap- 
pendix);8 
revisit several of their hypotheses (e.g., that legislative changes to make Sec- 
tion 301 more effective during the 1980s actually had this effect); 
expand their measure of  success to a four-part gradation and add to (and 
subtract from) their catalog of success-failure determinants; 
identify, isolate, and discuss the most anomalous Section 301 cases, which 
are observations with large and chronic residuals in our approach; 
examine the specification and residuals for evidence that the ‘‘size” of a case 
makes a difference (e.g., because of heteroskedasticity); and 
more precisely  define the marginal  efficacy  of  discretionary  determinants 
(e.g., whether explicit, public threats enhance negotiating success) and when 
the  marginal  effects  of  various  determinants  are  interdependent  (e.g., 
whether  threats  “work  better”  with  European  target  countries  than  with 
others). 
8. Summaries like those in the appendix for the seventy-two cases in Bayard and Elliott (1994) 
are available from the authors. Table 8.1  Ohservations Added to Rayard and Elliott Data Sample (Section 301 cases and petitions) 
Degree of Trade 
Actual Value of  Liberalization 
Period of  US.  Exports to the  GATT Panel  GATT Panel  Negotiating Objective  Resulting from 
301‘  Achieved?  Case No.  Target  Case’  Type of  Product  Targeth  Established?  Ruled’? 
Fortnu/ itive rtigntrori 7 
38  Taiwan  10/25/82-  Manufactured  Negligible 
12/19/83  (footwear) 
83  European 
Community 
88‘  China 
I1/28/90-  Agriculture related  Approx. $30 million 
10/93  (meatpacking)  (based on data in 
USTR files) 
10/10/91-  General market access  Approx. $2 billion, 
10/92  (QRs, licensing.  based on USTR 
technical barriers, and  retaliation threat 
lack of transparency 
in import regulations) 
N.A.  N.A.  No basis for allegations of  Very  modest 
unfair trade harriers found 
in investigation, but 
president directed USTR 
to pursue Taiwanese offers 
to lower tariffs and 
provide marketing 
assistance to U.S. 
exporters 
NO,’  No  Partially; two sides agreed  Modest 
to use “equivalency” 
principle in applying 
meatpacking plant 
standards to imported 
meat and meat products 
problems in  thus far, but 
implementation have  potentially 
occurred, China has 
largely met deadlines for  implemented 
removing specific 
nontariff barriers 
N.A.  N.A.  Partially; although  Probably modest 
significant if fully Table 8.1  (COlltlllU~d  J 
Degree of Trade 
Actual Value of  Liberalization 
Period of  U.S. Exports to thc  GATT Panel  GATT Panel  Negotiating Objective  Resulting from 
Case No.  Target  Case.'  Type of Product  Targeth  Estahlishcd'?  Ruled?  Achieved?  301' 
89'  Taiwan  4/29/92-  IP (copyright)  $370 million  N.A.  N.A.  Partially, although passage 
6/5/92  (USTR estimate)  and adequate enforcement 
of necessary legislation 
took another I8 months 
91'  Brazil 
93'  Japan 
98  Canada 






10/1/94-  Manufactured (auto  $7.5 billion (based  No' 
6/28/95  parts)  on planned 
retaliation) 
12/23/94-  Service (country  $130 million (based  N.A. 
6/22/95  music cable TV  on planned 
station)  retaliation) 
N.A.  Nominally, since Brazilian 
congress has yet to pass 
either the patent or the 
copyright hills by the 
promised deadlines (I  5 
June 1994 and  1 January 
1995, respectively) 
No  Nominally, given modest 
results and likelihood of 
recurrence 
N.A.  Partially, since US.  firm 
had to sign joint venture 
agreement to get back into 
market, hut with two 
Canadian firms with 
potentially triple the 
customer base 
Probably modest, 
although it also 
depends on the 




None to date 
Small at best 
Modest Negotiations wmlririg ,froin p~rifiiiri.~  nor ,fimicd/j imc,sfi~.orcr/ 
SROK  Korea,  1989  Goods, cervicc’r. and  Not calculable  N.A. 
“non-Super  30 I ”  FDI 
negotiation 
“non-Super  30 I” 
negotiation 
SROC  Taiwan  I989  Goods, services, IP  Not calculable  N.A. 
P-7  Korea  9/10/85-  Manufacturedservice  Approx. $10  million  No 
10/2S/85  (entry and distribution 
P- I  1  Japan  411 1/86-  Service (legal  Unknown  N.A. 
of films and videos) 
& 16  5/29/86;  services) 
1 / 16187- 
3/2/87 
4/7/88  (industry estimate 
P-I8  Chile  2122188-  IP  Approx. $IS million  N.A. 
of losses) 
N  A  Nominally becau5e  Little or none 
agreements not enforced 
N.A.  Nominally because  Modest at hest 
promises not fulfilled 
No  Nominally, because case  Little or none 
recurred (see P-28) 
N.A.  Partially, foreign lawyers  Modest 
allowed to practice but 
with extensive restrictions 
N.A.  Largely, Chile adopted  Modest 
improved patent law with 
only slight delays from 
promised deadlines: Chile 
remains on the lowest 
level Special 301 watch 
list, but there have been 
no recorded complaints 
about enforcement, only 
demands for additional 
protection, e.g.,  for 
pipeline products 
(continued) Table 8.1  (continucd) 
Degree of Trade 
Actual Value of  Liberalization 
Period of  U.S. Exports to the  GATT Panel  GATT Panel  Negotiating Objective  Resulting from 
Case No.  Target  Case'  Type of Product  Targeth  Established?  Ruled'?  Achieved?  301' 
P-23  Korea 
P-26  Japan 
P-28  Taiwan 
9/15/88-  Manufactured (films)  Approx. $10 million  N.A.  N.A.  Partially, since complaints  Modest 
10/28/88  (industry estimate  after this point focus 
of losses)  primarily on piracy, not 
access and distribution 
3/5/90-  Manufactured  Small  N.A.  N.A.  Partially, since Japanese  Small at best 
4/18/90  (amorphous metal  utilities purchased 
transformer cores)  transformers as promised 
for field testing and Allied 
Signal has not complained 
publicly about 
implementation 
lifted ban on imported 
distilled spirits, although 
high taxes and other 
restrictions remain 
N.A.  Partially, since Taiwan  Small at best  I2/3/90-  Manufactured  Small 
1/11/91  (distilled spirits) 
N.A 
Note: N.A. = not applicable; QR = quantitative restriction; IP = intellectual property; FDI = foreign direct investment. 
.'The first date is when the petition was filed; the end date is either when the petition was withdrawn or a formal case was terminated, suspended, or otherwise concluded. hUnless  otherwise indicated, the figures represent the value of U.S. exports to the target country after the case was concluded. The trade gain (in successful cases) or loss 
(in failures) would typically be a much lower figure. and. in cases involving honiogeneous products, the net gain or loss might be close to zero. The overstatement of actual 
loss is even greater in the cases involving export subsidies that affect third markets; in those cases, the smaller of US.  or target-country exports to the world are provided, 
even though it is likely that U.S. exports compete with subsidized exports from other countries in only some of its markets. The export figures provided are intended to 
give only a general idea-an  order of magnitude-of  the potential stakes involved and of the importance of trade in the sector to the U.S. economy; in other words, these 
data are meant only to distinguish “big” cases from “small” ones. 
‘Negative if retaliation imposed with no other resolution; none if there was no resolution or if other measures substituted for targeted practice or policy; modest if practice 
modified but not eliminated; significant if  practice eliminated or if there is a credible commitment to phase it out. 
“After the European Community twice blocked US. demands at GATT council meetings, a decision was finally made to establish a dispute settlement panel in an earlier 
iteration of this case (301-60).  An agreement was reached between U.S. and European negotiators before the panel could be appointed. This case was filed when that 
agreement failed to hold. 
Case  self-initiated. 
‘The USTR did notify the World Trade Organization that it was considering filing a complaint charging that Japanese practices “nullified and impaired” expected U.S. 
benefits under the agreement. 226  Kimberly Ann Elliott and J. David Richardson 
8.3  Econometric Specification and Conceptual Issues 
Figure 8.1  above  describes  Section 301 procedures  and  actors  visually. 
There are as many as four important groups of actors: private U.S. petitioners, 
the office of the U.S. trade representative, its foreign counterpart, and private 
foreign “offenders.” There are also, of course, other government agencies that 
are sometimes involved and occasionally  private agents that compete with a 
petitioner’s busine~s.~ 
There are also several possible procedures for “resolving” a case. The most 
common that  we can  observe  is the sequence of  formal petition,  consulta- 
tions  and  negotiations,  and  outcome  (either  agreement, sanctions  without 
agreement, or standoff). USTR records  and news accounts also allow us to 
observe a limited number of “preemptive settlements,” in which a trading part- 
ner makes concessions adequate to lead to a cessation  of formal 301 proce- 
dures (we added eight such cases to Bayard and Elliott’s sample). We cannot, 
however, observe two kinds of  would-be cases. One is deterrent cases, cases 
whose potential credibility is so strong that trading-partner  actors change ac- 
tions privately  to avoid even the beginnings of  a 301 petition. The second is 
wishful-thinking cases, cases not brought because one or another determinant/ 
correlate of outcomes makes success very unlikely.’O The inability to observe 
these types of cases creates classic selection bias in our procedures. But it is 
hard to know their net bias.  Unobserved would-be cases include both virtual 
successes and virtual failures. It is also hard to use standard corrections for 
selection bias since we had no information at all on “unbrought” cases. 
The combination of  multiple  actors  and multiple  procedures also makes 
econometric specification troublesome. No single agent’s behavior (or group of 
agents’ behavior) is present in every case. Nor is the sequence of environments 
leading to resolution or irresolution common to each observed case: sometimes 
it is threat followed by response; sometimes it is petition, “cooperative” negoti- 
ation, and then outcome; sometimes negotiations are punctuated by clear “non- 
cooperative” breakdown. 
Nevertheless, the same sorts of problems confront descriptive and historical 
analysis of Section 301 actions, so ‘‘loose’’  specification by itself is not suffi- 
cient to abjure our statistical approach. But it does make us more than usually 
cautious about our results. 
In our qualitative approach, we provide a four-part consensus assessment of 
the degree of  negotiating  resolution  in each Section 301 case, using USTR 
records, media accounts, and expert interviews, as outlined above. We distin- 
9. Polaroid, e.g., lobbied for involvement in Kodak’s Section 301 case. 
10. For example, Bayard’s and Elliott‘s variables include a measure of a target country’s reputa- 
tion  for swift, strong counrerreraliation against US.  sanctions. The threat of  counterretaliation 
could easily cause cases against rhose target countries not to be brought at all, rather than leading 
to failure among cases that are brought, as they assume in their probit analysis, where they find its 
influence insignificantly different from zero. 227  “Aggressively Unilateral” U.S. Trade Actions 
guish  cases  that  ended  in  the  following  outcomes:  no  agreement  at  all; 
an  agreement on paper  that  was  never  implemented or  later  reversed;  an 
agreement on some, but not all, of the issues under petition; and substantial 
agreement on all issues. We call these categories clear failure, marginal fail- 
ure, partial success, and clear success, respectively. We updated and extended 
the Bayard-Elliott (1994) sample to eighty-seven cases, adding fifteen cases 
described in the appendix and table 8.1 above, where it is also possible to see 
how these assessments are formed. For our eighty-seven cases, the sample size 
in each  of  the four groups above is, respectively,  twelve,  thirty, thirty-four, 
and eleven. 
Determining  the correlates of qualitative groupings like ours is one of the 
principal  uses  of  binomial  and  multinomial  probit,  logit,  and  related  ap- 
proaches. We pursued a binomial probit approach” to a success-failure aggre- 
gation of  the four outcomes from Section 301 cases and a multinomial logit 
approach to the four-way grouping.’*  For the binomial approach, we treated 
cases in the first two groups as “failures” and cases in the second two groups 
as “successes.” The binomial probit approach is essentially to fit a nonlinear 
regression” that generates an estimated “probability”  of  success (y = 1)  or 
failure (y  = 0) from a set of  independent variables. The multinomial  logit 
approach is essentially a nonlinear regression that generates estimated “proba- 
bilities” that an observation falls into one particular group relative to another, 
from a set of independent variables correlated with the classification mecha- 
nism. When the classification  mechanism creates an ordinal ranking  of out- 
come groups, as ours does, an “ordered’ multinomial  approach  also gives 
boundary points for the estimated probabilities. 
We  also experimented with  a quantitative  tobit  approach to outcomes of 
301 negotiations defined as the amount of trade recaptured. In considering the 
independent determinants of Section 301 outcomes, we started with the same 
guidance as Bayard  and Elliott  (1994,  79-85),  based  on McMillan (1990). 
McMillan suggests variables having to do with benefits and costs of compli- 
ance or defiance in the target country, and, given those, the net benefit of reso- 
lution in the particular case to the United States, plus perceptions of the same 
benefits and costs, perceptions that are shaped largely by negotiating tactics. 
To anticipate our results, we find some evidence for the first through a vari- 
able measuring a target country’s dependence on the U.S. market and hence 
I  I. Binomial logit approaches tend to produce very similar results to binomial probit approaches 
for samples like ours with balanced extremes, not heavily unbalanced toward either failure groups 
or success. See, e.g., the discussion in Greene (1993, 638). 
12. Baldwin and Steagall (1994). Mutti and Yeung (in press), and Hansen and Prusa (1995) are 
recent  binomial probit approaches to U.S. political-economic decision making as regards trade 
remedies. In their cases, unlike ours, there is a single dominant U.S. agency whose behavior is 
being explained. Appendix C of Destler, Odell, and Elliott (1987) is a multinomial logit approach 
to political activism against border protectionism. 
13. The functional form is a cumulative normal probability density function (PDF) in the case 
of probits and cumulative logistic PDF in the case of logits. 228  Kimberly Ann Elliott and J. David Richardson 
vulnerability  to U.S. trade sanctions.  But we find no evidence that the U.S. 
“stakes” in a case, as measured here, mattered to its successful resolution, ei- 
ther qualitatively or quantitatively, and only weak or little evidence that tactics 
like threats and accentuated pressures made a difference. In fact, our base spec- 
ification includes two strong correlates that seemed less important to us ex ante 
than those  above:  (I) a rough  measure of  the level of  overall “reciprocity,” 
specifically, the aggregate merchandise trade balance of the United States with 
the target country; and (2)  whether the case concerned  the “usual suspects,” 
specifically, unfair border practices that blocked merchandise access (in which 
case it was far more likely to be successful), or some other, newer issue (e.g., 
practices  toward  services  trade or intellectual  property  protection), or more 
narrowly “domestic” practice (e.g., regulatory access barriers). 
8.4  Qualitative Results 
Our multinomial approaches showed that it was almost impossible to distin- 
guish between clear and marginal failures using the independent variables that 
we had available. By contrast, cases that partially or largely succeeded could 
be distinguished  both from each other and from the failures on the basis of 
similar variables  (correlates). Therefore, we start below with our results on 
determinants of (binomial) “success” and “failure,” then show how the same 
variables help forecast clear versus  partial  successes. The following section 
describes our attempts to measure and explain Section 301 success quantita- 
tively. 
Our results showed a fairly consistent pattern across alternative specifica- 
tions  and robustness  checks. Some variables  that  we expected to be strong 
determinants of Section 301 outcomes seemed not to be; others that we thought 
to be less important turned out to be quite strong and omnipresent. We start 
with results from our so-called base specification, with its most promising vari- 
ations. We then describe the “dogs that didn’t bark”-the  patterns that did not 
emerge. Finally, we summarize several robustness checks and our analysis of 
“chronic”  residuals-the  cases that our base-specification  correlates always 
get wrong. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 define and statistically describe the variables 
involved in variations on our base specification. 
8.4.  I  Success or Failure? Results from the Probit Approach 
Table 8.4 summarizes results from our base specification. Three determi- 
nants seemed to predict  success and failure well regardless of what else we 
added:  the  target’s  exports  to  the  United  States  as  a  share  of  its  GNP 
(TXDEP2), the U.S. merchandise trade balance with the target (TBAL),I4 and 
a dummy variable taking on the value one when the case involved a border 
14. The large numerical size of  the TBAL variable does not distort the results, as reported in 
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Table 8.2  Variable Definitions 
A. Dependent variables 
SUCCESS 
OPENING 
0 if there is no agreement; 1 if an 
initially “successful” outcome is later 
reversed or an agreement inadequately 
implemented; 2 if there is partial 
achievement of negotiating goals; 3 if 
negotiating goals are largely achieved. 
Used in multinomial logits. 
0 if  SUCCESS = 0 or 1;  I  if SUCCESS 
= 2 or 3. Used in binomial probits. 






Target country’s exports to the United 
States as a percentage of GNP. 
U.S. trade balance with the target 
country. 
1 if there is a border measure affecting 
goods (import and export quotas and 
tariffs), 0 otherwise. 
otherwise. 
particular target country in question as 
a proportion of all cases started during 
years r, r  ~  I, and r  ~  2. (The number 
of cases in  1973 [pre-301] and  1974 
was set = 0.) 
I  if the case is initiated by USTR, 0 
Number of cases started against the 
barrier to U.S. merchandise exports (BORDER). We interpret these, respec- 
tively, as measures of target vulnerability to U.S. sanctions, crude reciprocity 
in trade re1ations,lS and the simplicity, familiarity, and/or legitimacy of the is- 
sue. As the coefficients suggest, 301 successes are more likely the greater is 
target vulnerability, the less reciprocal its trade posture appears to be, and the 
more the case concerns simple, familiar border barriers to traded merchandise, 
where the perceived  legitimacy of U.S. complaints is greater.  Column 4 re- 
cords estimated partial derivatives of the probability of success with respect to 
each determinant,’“  at (approximately) sample means of the variables. The en- 
try for TXDEP2 (1.95 I), for example, suggests that 301 cases are roughly 13.5 
15. Although there is little economic reason to consider the trade balance a measure of reciproc- 
ity, politicians and negotiators often do. Nothing that we tried as a more satisfactory economic 
measure  was at  all correlated with 301 outcomes. For an  approach to all unilateral US.  trade 
actions between  1990 and 1994, not just Section 301 actions, that also finds a significant role 
for the bilateral trade balance as an explanatory variable for US.  attention to trade disputes, see 
Noland (1995). 
16. Since the probit function is nonlinear, estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as par- 
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Table 8.3  Summary Statistics 
All Cases  “Successful” Cases  “Failed’ Cases 
Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
OPENING  ,517  I ,000  ,000 
TXDEP2  .065  ,069  ,082  ,080  ,047  .05 1 
TBAL  -  10,009.652  17,476.801  -  15,474.556  18,517.581  -4,154.398  14,310.341 
BORDER  .3 10  ,444  .I67 
INITIATE  ,264  ,333  . I90 
BULLY  ,173  ,218  .  I32  ,188  ,205  ,250 
Table 8.4 
Independent  Partial 
Variables  Coefficient  SE  t-Statistic  Derivative? 
Binomial Probit for Success-Failure: Base Specification 
Constant  -.891  ,254  -3.504  -.354 
TXDEP2  4.907  2.324  2.111  1.95 1 
TBAL  -  .00003 1  .000009  -3.268  -  .oooo I2 
BORDER  1.119  .34h  3.237  ,445 
Percentage of cases correctly predicted 
Maximum likelihood estimates: 
72.41 
Log likelihood  -47.16 
Restricted log likelihood (slopes = 0)  -60.25 
“Partial derivatives of  the probability of  success with  respect to each determinate at (approxi- 
mately) sample means of the variables. For sample means, see table 8.2. 
percent more likely to succeed against a target country with one standard devi- 
ation (0.069 from table 8.2) more vulnerability than the mean target (0.069 X 
I .95  1 = 0.135). The column 4 entry for BORDER is notable. The probability 
of  success for a 301 case involving a border barrier to merchandise trade is 
roughly 44 percent larger than for other kinds of barriers, a quite large differ- 
ential. 
Table 8.5 unpacks the base specification in a cross-tabular format to reveal 
two negative conclusions, about interactions and tactics.” The first is that there 
is no significant evidence of  multiplicative  (interaction)  effects between the 
three base determinants. This can be seen in the left-hand panel of  the table. 
Target  vulnerability  works  roughly  in  the  same  way  to  enhance  success 
whether the trade (im)balance is “high,” “medium,” or “low.” l8 And trade im- 
balance works the same whether target vulnerability is high, medium, or low. 
17. These are results from regressions that are not summarized in the tables. We had thought 
perhaps that success ratios would be especially high in cases where there was both heavy vulnera- 
bility and little reciprocity-more  than the sum of their effects might have suggested. We had also 
thought that explicit, public threats enhanced USTR credibility. Neither could be shown. 
18. In this context, a “high” trade balance signals a large deficit for the United States. Table 8.5  Cross-Tabular  Analysis of Success-Failure, Base Specification, with Detail’ 
Target Dependence 
All Observations  Only Observations with Explicit Threath 













































































Nore:  B = border measure; NB = nonborder trade barrier. For target dependence (target-country exports to the United States as a percentage of the target-country 
GNP), high = greater than  10 percent, medium = 3-10  percent, and low = less than 3 percent. For the US.  bilateral trade balance (in dollars), high = greater than 
-20  billion, medium = from  -I  to  ~  19 billion, and low = less than  ~I  billion. 
,‘Each cell shows the number of  successes as a proportion of the total number of cases in that category. 
hIncludes only case$ “self-initiated” by  the USTR  plus those in  which the USTR or the president issued a formal determination of unfairness with a deadlinc for 
taking action or published a hit list of  potential retaliation targets. 232  Kimberly Ann Elliott and J. David Richardson 
The likely success of  border cases appears in almost every cell. The second 
conclusion is that cases in which the USTR shows special tactical resolve, such 
as making explicit, public threats,  including  “hit lists” of goods to be sanc- 
tioned  if  the target is uncooperative,  are no more successful than  any other 
cases. This can be seen in the right-hand panel of the table, which isolates only 
the thirty-three  cases for which this was true. Their covariation through  the 
cells of the table is merely a scaled-down version of that in the left-hand panel 
for all the cases. In fact, we were never able to find significant evidence that 
tactical public threats of any kind made any difference, even when they seemed 
quite credible; they may merely have stiffened target resistance. 
Table 8.6 records results for several variations on the base specification. The 
first adds a dummy variable for those cases that the USTR “self-initiates” with- 
out petition. These have a higher chance of success-roughly  24 percent, ac- 
cording to the partial derivative-but  the coefficient is significant at only a 10 
percent level. The second variation adds a “bullying”  variable instead. This 
variable measures the frequency over a three-year interval that a given target 
country was hit with 301 cases relative to other target countries. There is weak 
evidence  of  diminishing returns  from concentrated cases against  any  single 
target country, but the coefficient is significant only at the 27 percent level. A 
10 percent increase in a target’s share of cases during any three-year interval 
reduces the chances of success by roughly 4 percent, according to the partial 
derivative, an effect that does not seem especially large. The third variation 
adds both the self-initiate dummy and the “bullying” variable. Results for the 
first are little affected, but the “bullying” variable declines still further in size 
and significance. 
Table 8.7 lists the “chronic residuals” for the binomial probits, cases that are 
mispredicted  across  virtually  all  variations.  l9  Some of  these  mispredictions 
seem innocuous, albeit  “chronic”-specifically,  those  with predicted  [Prob 
y  =  I] close to 0.50; they  were  all “close calls” for the regression.  Others 
seems more serious. There is little temporal pattern, in particular, no tendency 
for more recent cases to fail more often,  say, because of  completion of  the 
Uruguay Round (but the Japanese automobile case, case 93, may be a single- 
residual harbinger, according to some commentators). There is no discernible 
pattern with respect to any measure of the size or importance of a case or a 
trading partner. 
In fact, one of the surprising negative conclusions is that the hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity  of the residuals  could not be rejected in any case we tried 
(we tested for it with respect to both the trade balance and a measure of the 
alleged size of the trade under dispute). That is, the various regressions suggest 
that both  “big” and “small” cases are governed by  the same correlates, with 
little need for scaling of observations to take account of “size.” Indeed, this 
result seemed so surprising that we pursued it further, using a tobit approach 
19. Including some not summarized explicitly in the text Table 8.6  Binomial Probit for Success-Failure: Alternative Specifications 
With “Self-Initiate” Dummy and 
With “Self-Initiate” Dummy  With “Bullying” Measure  “Bullying” Measure 
Independent  Partial  Partial  Partial 
Variables  Coeff.  SE  t-Statistic  Derivatives”  Coeff.  SE  t-Statistic  Derivatives’  Coeff.  SE  t-Statistic  Derivatives,’ 
Constant  -1.076  ,282  -3.813  -.428  -.634  ,340  -  1.863  -.252  -.853  ,374  -2.284  -.340 
TXDEP2  5.333  2.397  2.225  2.121  4.240  2.373  1.786  1.686  4.744  2.456  1.932  1.887 
BORDER  1.228  ,354  3.465  ,488  1.186  ,358  3.313  ,472  1.279  ,366  3.50  SO9 
lNITIATE  ,605  ,364  1.662  ,241  ,559  ,367  1.522  .223 
BULLY 
TBAL  -.000026  .000010  -2.780  -.000011  -.000030  .000009  -3.139  -.000012  -.000026  .000010  -2.718  -.000010 
-1.056  ,951  -1.110  -.420  -.860  ,967  -.890  -.342 




Log likelihood  -45.15  -46.53  -45.35 
Restricted log  -60.25  -60.25  -60.25 
likelihood (slopes = 0) 
,‘Partial derivatives of the probability of success with respect to each determinate at (approximately) sample means of  the variables. For sample means, see table 8.2. Table 8.7  Binomial Probit for Success-Failure: Chronic Outliers 
Residuals (Probry = I]) from Base 
Specification with: 
Year Case  Target 
Ca\e No.  Resolved  Country  Issue 
Type of  Base  INITIATE 
Barrier  Specification  INITIATE  BULLY  and BULLY 
Observed failures/predicted successes: 
24  I982  Argentina 
34  1982  Canada 
41  1985  Portugal 
48  1991  Japan 
72  1990  Thailand 
80  1992  Canada 
93  1995  Japan 
P-7  1985  Korea 
SROC  1989  Taiwan 
3  1980  EC 
25  1987  EC 
40  1985  Brazil 
44  1989  Argentina 
49  1989  Brazil 
53  1988  Argentina 
71  1989  EC 
83  1992  EC 
P-I8  1988  Chile 
Observed successes/predicted failures: 
Export ban on hides 
Investment incentives for machinery 
Restrictions on oilseed imports 
Semiconductor  market access 
Ban on cigarette imports 
Provincial restrictions on beer 
Market access for autos and parts etc 
Market access for foreign films 
Super 301 negotiations 
Variable levies on egg products 
Pasta export subsidies 
Export subsidies for soybeans 
Restrictions on air courier services 
Informatics policy 
Export subsidies for soybeans 





















,624  ,598 
.609  ,544 
,638  .614 
.7  1 1  .585 
.73  I  .712 
.67  I  ,612 
,890  .919 
.844  335 
,611  ,545 
,401  ,401 
,459  ,356 
.270  ,212 
.217  .I69 
.242  .387 
,207  .I60 
,203  ,345 
,148  ,116 
,294  ,242 
,653  ,626 
,623  ,559 
.724  .689 
,725  ,608 
303  ,776 
,699  .640 
275  ,907 
,842  ,834 
.648  .581 
,266  ,290 
,365  ,292 
,304  ,241 
.25 1  .196 
.267  ,400 
.258  .199 
.213  ,343 
.  I70  ,134 
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to the subsample of observations for which we had a reliable measure of the 
trade  lost from the allegedly  unfair  practice  abroad.*O This approach is de- 
scribed below in section 8.5. 
We also experimented with the sensitivity of our results to success-failure 
reclassification of some of the more controversial cases (since the margins of 
the basic classifications are judgmental). The estimated coefficients were quite 
robust to changing the verdict on both the semiconductor case (48) and the 
automobile case (93), although, of course, that took care of those two residuals. 
Other surprising conclusions from the binomial probits involved expected 
patterns that did not emerge. In addition to those discussed above, we could 
find no evidence that the probability of success was influenced by the amount 
of trade or other business “at stake” in the case. (Although target-country resis- 
tance may be high in such cases because the same value is “at risk’ in their 
eyes,  properly controlling for the target’s benefits  and  costs of  compliance 
should have left this variable reflecting the U.S. stakes only). We could find no 
evidence that the probability  of  success was influenced by  whether the case 
was transparent, involving reasonably clear taxes and subsidies or more opaque 
barriers, or whether the case involved the complex “new issues” of  services 
and intellectual property or more familiar traditional barriers. We could also 
find no evidence that the probability of success was influenced by the differ- 
ence between agricultural  or nonagricultural  cases or by time in general. As 
for the latter, recent cases that were not in Bayard’s and Elliott’s data but that 
have been added to ours did not change their conclusions using their specifica- 
tions. 
One time-related conclusion, however, can be taken either negatively or pos- 
itively. Time dummies that isolate the early 1980s from the period from 1985 
to 1988 show markedly higher success rates in the latter period and markedly 
lower success rates in the former, ceteris paribus.”  Bayard and Elliott relate 
the higher mid- 1980s success to legislative and administrative changes aimed 
at signaling a new  “get-tough’’ stance. The effects of  the two dummies are 
almost exactly offsetting, however,  so that an alternative explanation  is the 
change in trade policy personnel  and style between  the first and the second 
Reagan administrations without any necessarily lasting consequence. 
8.4.2  Shadings of Success and Failure: Results from the Multinomial 
Logit Approach 
We also experimented with explaining the richer four-way breakdown of the 
Table 8.8 summarizes the results of two variations of unordered multinomial 
cases into clear and partial successes and failures. 
20. Many cases had no measure at all of the trade under dispute, usually when they involved a 
large number of disparate practices affecting many different American exports. Case 88 against 
multiple Chinese access restrictions is one example. 
21, See Bayard and Elliott (1994, 86-90), whose configuration of time dummies can be reinter- 
preted as in the text. 236  Kimberly Ann Elliott and J.  David Richardson 
Table 8.8  Unordered Multinomial Logit for Clear and Marginal Shades of 
Success and Failure (clear failure = omitted category) 
Base Specification  With “Self-Initiate” Dummy 
Independent 














-  ,246 
-  .00005 1 
.3 11 
-  SO6 
8.035 
-  .000092 
1.820 
Clear success: 
Constant  -2.150 
TXDEP2  3.784 
TBAL  -.000106 
BORDER  3.001 
INITIATE 








(slopes = 0) 
correctly predicted: 
Maximum likelihood estimates: 
,494  1.525 
7.423  p.033 
.000040 -  1.270 
.957  ,325 
,587  p.863 
7.188  1.118 
.954  1.907 
,000041  -2.243 
,898  -2.393 
8.521  ,444 
1.122  2.674 






-  110.41 
.958 
-  ,902 
-  .000057 
,193 
-.803 
-  .548 
7.909 































-  1.360 
.I99 
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logits with clear failures as the omitted category. The coefficients should be 
read relative to clear failure; thus, the first four coefficients in table 8.8 record 
the determinants of the probability of a case being a marginal failure instead 
of  a clear failure. These coefficients are largely  insignificant, indicating that 
the determinants  do not allow us to distinguish between clear and marginal 
failures. But the next four coefficients record the determinants of  the probabil- 
ity of a case being a marginal success instead of a clear failure, the last four a 
clear success instead of a clear failure. Trade dependence (vulnerability) loses 
its significance here, but the trade balance (reciprocity) and the border dummy 
are quite significant, and self-initiation is marginally significant.22  Their coef- 
22. In variations with BULLY, its coefficients were never even marginally significant. 237  “Aggressively Unilateral” US. Trade Actions 
ficients are larger in the case of  clear successes than in the case of marginal 
successes, implying that they also contribute in the familiar way to degrees of 
success as well  as its likeliho~d.~~  Nevertheless,  the multinomial  logit runs 
clearly underpredict  the extremes of the actual distribution,  both  clear suc- 
cesses and clear failures. 
8.5  Quantitative Results 
We  also experimented  with a quantitative counterpart to our multinomial 
logit approach. For the thirty-six (of eighty-seven) cases in which we could 
reasonably measure the trade at stake in the  we estimated the amount 
of trade “reclaimed” by the Section 301 procedure.2J  That amount was zero in 
cases of clear failures and all the trade under dispute in cases of  clear  suc- 
cesses. We then ran tobit specifications on base and alternative specifications 
similar to those in the qualitative results above. Results were in general quite 
mixed. They were very similar to the qualitative multinomial logits when the 
trade reclaimed was expressed as a percentage of the historical level of trade 
in  similar goods and when three very large percentage outliers (for cases 57, 
64, and 65) were omitted. In all other tobit runs, overall explanatory power was 
very low. 
8.6  Policy Considerations 
Bayard and Elliott (1994) concluded that Section 301 was unlikely to be as 
effective in the future as it had been in the previous decade. The sources of 
disputes  are becoming  less tractable, and its use will be  constrained by  the 
new  World Trade Organization,  which embodies  an alternative, multilateral 
grievance mechanism that was shaped to match U.S. preferences. That conclu- 
sion is buttressed both by results reported here and by recent events. This study 
finds that the apparent upward  trend in post-1985  Section 301 effectiveness 
largely disappears  if  the  Reagan  administration  peaks  and  valleys are con- 
trolled for. And a National Journal postmortem on the US.-Japan automobile 
dispute concluded,  “One clear lesson is that  section 301 . . . is no longer a 
fearsome weapon” (Stokes 1995, 2098). The article also quoted an aide to the 
Democratic House leadership as saying that “Section 301 has been doomed to 
a quiet death.” That may be too strong, but the recent spat over automobiles 
23. We also tried ordered multinomial logits corresponding to table 8.8. The general pattern of 
24. See n. 20 above. 
25. Procedures and details are available from the authors. 
results is very similar, although the coefficient on the self-initiate dummy grew in significance. 238  Kimberly Ann Elliott and J. David Richardson 
and automobile parts (one of our “chronic residuals”) and the dispute with the 
European Union (EU) over its banana regime highlight another difficulty not 
seriously considered by Bayard and Elliott or, indeed, by Mickey Kantor: the 
paucity of feasible WTO-legal sanctions that can be used as negotiating lever- 
age in cases not covered by WTO rules.26 
Recent cases provide other indicators of  the future. One possibility  is that 
Section 301 will be supplemented and then supplanted by the WTO’s new al- 
ternative  grievance me~hanism.~’  The recent  dispute  (301  -95) over  Korean 
shelf-life standards for sausages and other meat, for example, suggests that 
even the threat of asking for formal WTO intervention can provide significant 
leverage. In that case, Korean and American negotiators reached an acceptable 
compromise  within days of  a deadline that U.S. negotiators had  set for re- 
questing establishment of a WTO dispute settlement 
But, conversely, Bayard and Elliott (1994) predicted that US.  threats would 
become  weaker  if  a  dispute  involved  issues  covered  by  the WTO,  yet  the 
United States failed to follow WTO dispute settlement procedures or threat- 
ened to retaliate by withdrawing WTO-covered concessions (e.g., bound tar- 
iffs). Although US. negotiators considered filing a “nonviolation nullification 
and impairment” complaint in the WTO during the recent dispute over Japa- 
nese practices in the automobile sector (301-93), the core of that case involved 
competition policy issues not covered by WTO rules. U.S. negotiators appar- 
ently were unwilling to impose blatantly illegal sanctions against Japan-rais- 
ing bound tariffs to prohibitive  levels on imported Japanese luxury automo- 
biles-and,  when Japanese negotiators called their bluff, they blinked. 
Bayard and Elliott correspondingly predicted that the effectiveness of U.S. 
threats  would  be  unchanged  if  disputes  involved issues not covered  by  the 
WTO or nonmembers and the United States did not withdraw WTO-covered 
concessions. But it has apparently been more difficult than supposed to iden- 
tify  WTO-legal  sanctions that  might  make effective threats  in  areas where 
WTO rules do not apply. In testimony before the Senate commerce committee 
26. In the language of game theory, this is described as a contraction of the “threat set”-the 
set of outcomes that can be unilaterally assured and implies diminished effectiveness of  these 
“grievance bilaterals.” 
27. As of late 1995, eight Section 301 investigations had been launched since the research for 
Reciprociv and Retaliafion (Bayard and Elliott 1994) was completed. Five of those cases involve 
nonborder issues where successful outcomes have been both less frequent and less predictable in 
the past: one each involving intellectual property issues (China, 301-92), services (Canadian cable 
television, 301  -98), and technical regulatory barriers (Korean health regulations for meat, 301-95) 
and two alleging anticompetitive practices in Japan (automobiles and parts, 301-93, and photo- 
graphic film and paper, 301-99). The other three investigations, targeting the European  Union, 
Colombia, and Costa Rica, all involve implementation of the EU’s import preference scheme for 
bananas from former colonial areas. 
28. The desire of  the Korean negotiators to put the acrimonious dispute behind them before 
President Kim Young Sam’s state visit to Washington at the end of  July apparently provided addi- 
tional leverage (see Inside  U.S. Trade, 14 July  1995; and Journal of  Commerce, 21 July  1995, 
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in June  1994, USTR Kantor listed several areas that might yield WTO-legal 
sanctions. But the list is not very long, and in many cases it is not relevant to 
important trading partners: 
takmg action in the maritime sector under the authority of the Federal Mari- 
denying telecommunications and/or banking licenses; 
placing conditions on foreign aid; 
putting limits on science and technology cooperation agreements; and 
denying certain visas (International Trade Reportel; 22 June 1994, 979). 
time Commission; 
Services like shipping, communications, and banking seem an attractive re- 
taliation option because there are few or no WTO constraints in many sectors 
and because many tradable services remain relatively heavily regulated. This 
means that there will often be both administrative authority and tools available 
to the government to intervene. But the same things that make services attrac- 
tive for retaliation make counterretaliation easier and, if desired, less transpar- 
ent to any but the affected target. In the recent banana case, for example, nego- 
tiators reportedly considered, among other things, imposing a fee on entry into 
U.S. ports of  EU-owned  or -flagged ships but backed  off, in part,  because 
they-and  the U.S. industry-feared  counterretaliation against U.S. shippers 
(Inside U.S. Trade, 17 February  1995, I). 
There are further problems with developing countries. In the short and me- 
dium run, retaliation in service sectors is not likely to be at all effective against 
them because they do not yet have competitive tradable services. Other items 
on the Kantor list may not be of sufficient value to target countries to induce 
them to open their markets in important sectors. Termination, reduction,  or 
suspension of benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) has 
been used as a sanction in the past in intellectual property cases, but legislative 
authority for that program lapsed in mid-1995 and, even if restored by Con- 
gress, will be of  diminishing value because of  country graduations, product 
restrictions,  and declining preference margins  as the Uruguay Round tariff 
concessions are phased in. 
In sum, American retaliatory threats under Section 301 may be more con- 
strained than initially realized when the WTO was signed. Shortly before the 
deadline for taking action in the EU banana case, and apparently having failed 
to come up with other viable retaliation hit-list candidates, the Clinton admin- 
istration belatedly decided to take the case to the WT0.29  The Journal of  Com- 
29. The USTR had not earlier taken this case to the WTO because its jurisdiction with respect 
to the American complaint is somewhat murky. The private plaintiff is a US.-based firm,  Chiquita, 
that ships, markets, and distributes Latin American bananas in the EU, but there is no direct trade 
between the United States and the EU involved. In a case brought by  several adversely affected 240  Kimberly Ann Elliott and J. David Richardson 
merce (28 September 1995,3A)  reported that “the decision . . . is a tacit admis- 
sion that the United States retains little leverage in imposing its will in trade 
matters outside of the newly powerful WTO.” 
In U.S. history, vigilantism  was ultimately  displaced  by a more effective 
system of justice. Bayard and Elliott (1994) consider a strategic alternative to 
Section 301 that they call “aggressive multilateralism” (using the WTO to set- 
tle disputes where possible) and “creative minilateralism” (negotiations with 
like-minded trading partners to write rules in areas not covered by the intema- 
tional rules). In cases covered by WTO rules, they argue, the United States can 
retaliate once authorized to do so, just as under Section 301, but that power 
will probably be rarely needed under the strengthened dispute settlement pro- 
cedures. In other cases, retaliation against WTO-covered trade risks precipitat- 
ing a shoot-out that nobody wins. Their discussion seems prescient in the wake 
of the U.S.-Japan automobile dispute. It may be an auspicious time for the self- 
appointed marshal1 to retire. 
Appendix 
Recent Cases and Issues in Expanding the Bayard- 
Elliott Database 
The Bayard and Elliott (1994) database of Section 301 cases included seventy- 
two of the ninety-one investigations opened as of that time.’O  One aim of the 
present analysis was to update and extend the database where possible. This 
was done in three ways: (1) by reviewing the nineteen Section 301 cases ex- 
cluded by Bayard and Elliott; (2) by adding Section 301 cases resolved  since 
that research was completed; (3) and by adding cases from the “p-list” of Sec- 
tion 301 petitions filed but not formally accepted by the USTR. Our assess- 
ments of the fifteen cases added are summarized in table 8.1 above. 
1. Bayard and Elliott omitted several cases where the USTR concluded that 
the practice cited in the complaint was not actionable, either because the prac- 
tice was not unreasonable under the statute’s meaning or because  it did not 
injure U.S. commercial interests. Following further review, one of those cases 
was restored to the database used here. Case 301-38 involved alleged Taiwan- 
ese subsidies for footwear exporters and restrictions on imports. In his formal 
~  ~  ~~  ~~~~~~ 
Latin American producers, an earlier GATT panel ruled in  1993 that the EU regime violated scv- 
era1 GATT articles. The EU blocked adoption of the report, yet reached agreements with most of 
the  major Latin American producers to lessen  the  injury, and  asked for a WTO waiver  for its 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific preference program (Inside U.S. Trade, 9 September 1994, 13). 
30. For an explanation of which cases were excluded and why, see Bayard and Elliott (1994, 59. 
n. 3). 241  ”‘Aggressively  Unilateral” U.S. Trade Actions 
determination in that case, President Reagan found that Taiwan’s practices were 
not unreasonable, but he also directed the U.S. trade representative to pursue 
offers from Taiwan to lower its tariffs on footwear and to provide marketing 
assistance to US.  exporters, indicating that the 301 investigation induced some 
concessions, however modest (Bayard and Elliott 1994, 410-1 1). 
2. Four other cases were excluded because they had not been resolved long 
enough for the authors to feel confident in making judgments about the out- 
comes. All those cases have been added to the data used here: 301-83, regard- 
ing EU standards for meatpacking  facilities;  301-88, which  resulted  in the 
memorandum of understanding on access to the Chinese market; and 301-89 
and 301  -9 1, regarding protection of intellectual property rights in Taiwan and 
Brazil, respectively. 
Two other cases resolved in the past year have also been added to the data- 
base. Although the results are still hotly debated, the recent U.S.-Japan  auto- 
mobile and automobile parts agreement (case 301-93) has been included be- 
cause it strikes us as a marginal achievement at best, especially given the bluff 
and bluster  surrounding  the negotiations.  Moreover,  given the  ongoing dis- 
agreement among negotiators about what exactly was agreed, the case seems 
almost certain to be reopened at some point, which would classify it as a mar- 
ginal failure. Nevertheless,  given the controversy, we tested the sensitivity of 
the results to variations in this judgment. 
The other recent case added (301-98) is the dispute arising from Canada’s 
decision  to revoke the license of a U.S.-owned  country music cable station 
operating there. That case was resolved through a joint venture agreement be- 
tween the American cable company and the Canadian firm that replaced it. The 
agreement apparently was acceptable to both parties, but the terms also seem 
to have been influenced by the potential threat of Section 301 sanctions, mak- 
ing it, in our view, a partial success for U.S. negotiators. 
3. Finally, we have added eight cases where the threat of a Section 301 inves- 
tigation being opened appears to have provided  leverage to U.S. negotiators. 
As of the beginning of  1995, twenty-eight Section 301 petitions had been filed 
but not formally accepted by the USTR between 1980 and 1990, the so-called 
p-list cases. Only rarely does the USTR openly reject petitions.”  Most often, 
petitions are withdrawn just before the forty-five-day deadline for acceptance 
or rejection by  the  USTR. In many  of  these cases, it is simply not known 
whether the petitioner was persuaded to withdraw  its complaint to avoid the 
embarrassment of rejection or whether a resolution was achieved through quiet 
diplomacy.  In six cases, however, through press reports, the USTR’s annual 
National Trade Estimates reports, and other sources, we concluded that there 
3  I. It did formally reject two petitions from the Rice Millers Association when it determined 
that multilateral negotiations under the Uruguay Round would be a more effective means ofopen- 
ing Japan’s market. 242  Kimberly Ann Elliott and J. David Richardson 
was evidence that the USTR had used the threat of a 301 investigation as nego- 
tiating leverage and that  sufficient information  about the outcomes in those 
episodes existed  to include them  here. The cases are briefly  summarized in 
table 8.1 above. 
We  have also added the agreements negotiated with Korea and Taiwan in 
1989 under threat of  Super 301 designation. In these cases, public comments 
were requested by the USTR as to what countries or practices should be chosen 
for Super 301 priority designation. Although no formal petitions were filed in 
this process, the number and tenor of complaints received, and press reports 
speculating about likely targets, convinced Korea and Taiwan to negotiate pre- 
emptively. Thus, we treat these cases as alun to the other episodes when coun- 
tries named  in  Section  301 petitions  chose to negotiate  in order to  avoid a 
formal 30 1 investigation. 
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